Eric Schrock's Blog

Month: November 2005

In the later months of ZFS development, the mechanism used to open and import pools was drastically changed. The reasons behind this change make an interesting case study in complexity management and how a few careful observations can make all the difference.

The original spa_open()

Skipping past some of the very early prototypes, we’ll start with the scheme that Jeff implemented back in 2003. The scheme had a lofty goal:

Be able to open a pool from an arbitrary subset of devices within the pool.

Of course, given limited label space, it was not possible to guarantee this entirely, but we created a scheme which would work in all but the most pessimistic scenarios. Basically, each device was part of a strongly connected graph made up of each toplevel vdev. The graph began with a circle of all the toplevel vdevs. Each device had it’s parent vdev config, the vdev configs of the nearest neighbors, and up to 5 other vdev configs for good measure. When we went to open the pool, we read in this graph and constructed the complete vdev tree which we then used to open the pool.

You can see the original ‘big theory’ comment from the top of vdev_graph.c here.

First signs of problems

The simplest problem to notice was that these vdev configs were stored in a special one-off ASCII representation that required a special parser in the kernel. In a world where we were rapidly transitioning to nvlists, this wasn’t really a good idea.

The first signs of real problems came when I tried to implement the import functionality. For import, we needed the ability to know if a pool could be imported without actually opening it. This had existed in a rather disgusting form previously by linking to libzpool (which is the userland port of the SPA and DMU code), and hijacking the versions of these functions to construct a vdev tree in userland. In the new userland model, it wasn’t acceptable to use libzpool in this manner. So, I had to construct spa_open_by_dev() that parsed the configuration into a vdev tree and tried to open the vdevs, but not actually load the pool metadata.

This required a fair amount of hackery, but it was nowhere near as bad as when I had to make the resulting system tolerant of all faults. For both ‘zpool import’ and ‘zpool status’, it wasn’t enough just to know that a pool couldn’t be opened. We needed to know why, and exactly which devices were at fault. While the original scheme worked well when a single device was missing in a toplevel vdev, it failed miserably when an entire toplevel vdev was missing. In particular, it relied on the fact that it had at least a complete ring of toplevel vdevs to work with. For example, you were missing a single device in an unmirrored pool, there was no way to know what device was missing because the entire graph parsing algorithm would break down. So, I went in and hacked on the code to understand multiple “versions” of a vdev config. If we had two neighbors referring to a missing toplevel vdev, we could surmise its config even though all its devices were absent.

At this point, things were already getting brittle. The code was enormously complex, and hard to change in any well defined way. On top of that, things got even worse when our test guys started getting really creative. In particular, if you disconnected a device and then exported a pool, or created a new pool over parts of an exported pool, things would get ugly fast. The labels on the disks would be technically valid, but semantically invalid. I had to make even more changes to the algorithms to accomodate all these edge cases. Eventually, it got to the point where every change I made was prefixed by /* XXX kludge */. Jeff and I decided something needed to be done.

On top of all this, the system still had a single point of failure. Since we didn’t want to scan every attached device on boot, we kept an /etc/system file around that described the first device in the pool as a ‘hint’ for where to get started. If this file was corrupt, or that particular toplevel vdev was not available, the pool configuration could not be determined.

vdev graph 2.0

At this point we had a complex, brittle, and functionally insufficient system for discovering pools. As Jeff, Bill, and I talked about this problem for a while, we made two key observations:

  • The kernel didn’t have parse the graph. We already had the case where we were dependent on a cached file for opening our pool, so why not keep the whole configuration there? The kernel can do (relatively) atomic updates to this file on configuration changes, and then open the resulting vdev tree without having to construct it based on on-disk data.
  • During import, we already need to check all devices in the system. We don’t have to worry about ‘discovering’ other toplevel vdevs, because we know that we will, by definition, look at the device during the discovery phase.

With these two observations under our belt, we knew what we had to do. For both open and import, the SPA would know only how to take a fully constructed config and parse it into a working vdev tree. Whether that config came from the new /etc/zfs/zpool.cache file, or whether it was constructed during a ‘zpool import’ scan, it didn’t matter. The code would be exactly the same. And best of all, no complicated discovery phase – the config was taken at face value1. And the config was simply an nvlist. No more special parsing of custom ‘vdev spec’ strings.

So how does import work?

The config cache was all well and good, but how would import work? And how would it fare in the face of total device failure? You can find all of the logic for ‘zpool import’ in libzfs_import.c.

Each device keeps the complete config for its toplevel vdev. No neighbors, no graph, no nothing. During pool discovery, we keep track of all toplevel vdevs for a given pool that we find during a scan. Using some simple heuristics, we construct the ‘best’ version of the pool’s config, and even go through and update the path and devid information based on the unique GUID for each device. Once that’s done, we have the same nvlist we would have as if we had read it from zpool.cache. The kernel happily goes off and tries to open the vdevs (if this is just a scan) or open it for real (if we’re doing the import).

So what about missing toplevel vdevs? In the online (cached) state, we’ll have the complete config and tell you which device is missing. For the import case, we’ll be a little worse off because we’ll never see any vdevs indicating that there is another toplevel vdev in the pool. The most important thing is that we’re able to detect this case and error out properly. To do this, we have a ‘vdev guid sum’ stored in the uberblock that indicates the sum of all the vdev guids for every device in the config. If this doesn’t match, we know that we have missed a toplevel vdev somewhere. Unfortunately, we can’t tell you what device it is. In the future, we hope to improve this by adding the concept of ‘neighbor lists’ – arbitrary lists of devices without entire vdev configs. Unlike the previous incarnation of vdev graph, these will be purely suggestions, and not actually be required for correctness. There will, of course, be cases where we can never provide you enough information about all your neighbors, such as plugging in a single disk from a thousand disk unreplicated pool.

Conclusions

So what did we learn from this? The main thing is that phrasing the problem slightly differently can cause you to overdesign a system beyond the point of maintainability. As Bryan is fond of saying, one of the most difficult parts of solving hard problems is not just working within a highly constrained environment, but identifying which constraints aren’t needed at all. By realizing that opening a pool was a very different operation than discovering a pool, we were able to redesign our interfaces into a much more robust and maintainable state, with more features to boot.

It’s no surprise that there were more than a few putbacks like “SPA 2.0”, “DMU 2.0”, or “ZIL 3.0”. Sometimes you just need to take a hammer to the foundation to incorporate all that you’ve learned from years of using the previous version.


1 Actually, Jeff made this a little more robust by adding the config as part of the MOS (Meta objset), which is stored transactionally with the rest of the pool data. So even if we added two devices, but the /etc cache file didn’t get updated correctly, we’ll still be able to open the MOS config and realize that there are two new devices to be had.

In this post I’ll describe the interactions between ZFS and FMA (Fault Management Architecture). I’ll cover the support that’s present today, as well as what we’re working on and where we’re headed.

ZFS Today (phase zero)

The FMA support in ZFS today is what we like to call “phase zero”. It’s basically the minimal amount of integration needed in order to leverage (arguably) the most useful feature in FMA: knowledge articles. One of the key FMA concepts is to present faults in a readable, consistent manner across all subsystems. Error messages are human readable, contain precise descriptions of what’s wrong and how to fix it, and point the user to a website that can be updated more frequently with the latest information.

ZFS makes use of this strategy in the ‘zpool status’ command:

$ zpool status
pool: tank
state: ONLINE
status: One or more devices has experienced an unrecoverable error.  An
attempt was made to correct the error.  Applications are unaffected.
action: Determine if the device needs to be replaced, and clear the errors
using 'zpool online' or replace the device with 'zpool replace'.
see: http://www.sun.com/msg/ZFS-8000-9P
scrub: none requested
config:
NAME        STATE     READ WRITE CKSUM
tank        ONLINE       0     0     0
mirror    ONLINE       0     0     0
c1d0s0  ONLINE       0     0     3
c0d0s0  ONLINE       0     0     0

In this example, one of our disks has experienced multiple checksum errors (because I dd(1)ed over most of the disk), but it was automatically corrected thanks to the mirrored configuration. The error message described exactly what has happened (we tried to self-heal the data from the other side of the mirror) and the impact (none – applications are unaffected). It also directs the user to the appropriate repair procedure, which is either to clear the errors (if they are not indicative of hardware fault) or replace the device.

It’s worth noting here the ambiguity of the fault. We don’t actually know if the errors are due to bad hardware, transient phenomena, or administrator error. More on this later.

ZFS tomorrow (phase one)

If we look at the implementation of ‘zpool status’, we see that there is no actual interaction with the FMA subsystem apart from the link to the knowledge article. There are no generated events or faults, and no diagnosis engine or agent to subscribe to the events. The implementation is entirely static, and contained within libzfs_status.c.

This is obviously not an ideal solution. It doesn’t give the administrator any notification of errors as they occur, nor does it allow them to leverage other pieces of the FMA framework (such as upcoming SNMP trap support). This is going to be addressed in the near term by the first “real” phase of FMA integration. The goal of this phase, in addition to a number of other fault capabilities under the hood, is the following:

  • Event Generation – I/O errors and vdev transitions will result in true FMA ereports. These will be generated by the SPA and fed through the FMA framework for further analysis.
  • Simple Diagnosis Engine – An extremely dumb diagnosis engine will be provided to consume these ereports. It will not perform any sort of predictive analysis, but will be able to keep track of whether these errors have been seen before, and pass them off to the appropriate agent.
  • Syslog agent – The results from the DE will be fed to an agent that simply forwards the faults to syslog for the administrator’s benefit. This will give the same messages as seen in ‘zpool status’ (with slightly less information) synchronous with a fault event. Future work to generate SNMP traps will allow the administrator to be email, paged, or implement a poor man’s hot spare system.

ZFS in the future (phase next)

Where we go from here is rather an open road. The careful observer will notice that ZFS never makes any determination that a device is faulted due to errors. If the device fails to reopen after an I/O error, we will mark it as faulted, but this only catches cases where a device has gotten completely out of whack. Even if your device is experiencing a hundred uncorrectable I/O errors per second, ZFS will continue along its merry way, notifying the administrator but otherwise doing nothing. This is not because we don’t want to take the device offline; it’s just that getting the behavior right is hard.

What we’d like to see is some kind of predictive analysis of the error rates, in an attempt to determine if a device is truly damaged, or whether it was just a random event. The diagnosis engines provided by FMA are designed for exactly this, though the hard part is determining the algorithms for making this distinction. ZFS is both a consumer of FMA faults (in order to take proactive action) as well as a producer of ereports (detecting checksum errors). To be done right, we need to harden all of our I/O drivers to generate proper FMA ereports, implement a generic I/O retire mechanism, and link it in with all the additional data from ZFS. We also want to gather SMART data from the drives to notice correctible errors fixed by the firmware, as well doing experiments to determine the failure rates and pathologies of common storage drives.

As you can tell, this is not easy. I/O fault diagnosis is much more complicated than CPU and memory diagnosis. There are simply more components, as well as more changes for administrative error. But between FMA and ZFS, we have laid the groundwork for a truly fault-tolerant system capable of predictive self healing and automated recovery. Once we get past the initial phase above, we’ll start to think about this in more detail, and make our ideas public as well.

A lot of comparisons have been done, and will continue to be done, between ZFS and other filesystems. People tend to focus on performance, features, and CLI tools as they are easier to compare. I thought I’d take a moment to look at differences in the code complexity between UFS and ZFS. It is well known within the kernel group that UFS is about as brittle as code can get. 20 years of ongoing development, with feature after feature being bolted on tends to result in a rather complicated system. Even the smallest changes can have wide ranging effects, resulting in a huge amount of testing and inevitable panics and escalations. And while SVM is considerably newer, it is a huge beast with its own set of problems. Since ZFS is both a volume manager and a filesystem, we can use this script written by Jeff to count the lines of source code in each component. Not a true measure of complexity, but a reasonable approximation to be sure. Running it on the latest version of the gate yields:

-------------------------------------------------
UFS: kernel= 46806   user= 40147   total= 86953
SVM: kernel= 75917   user=161984   total=237901
TOTAL: kernel=122723   user=202131   total=324854
-------------------------------------------------
ZFS: kernel= 50239   user= 21073   total= 71312
-------------------------------------------------

The numbers are rather astounding. Having written most of the ZFS CLI, I found the most horrifying number to be the 162,000 lines of userland code to support SVM. This is more than twice the size of all the ZFS code (kernel and user) put together! And in the end, ZFS is about 1/5th the size of UFS and SVM. I wonder what those ZFS numbers will look like in 20 years…

Well, I’m back. I’ve been holding off blogging for a while due to ZFS. Now that it’s been released, I’ve got tons of stuff lined up to talk about in the coming weeks.

I first started working on ZFS about nine months ago, and my primary task from the beginning was to redesign the CLI for managing storage pools and filesystems. The existing CLI at the time had evolved rather organically over the previous 3 years, each successive feature providing some immediate benefit but lacking in long-term or overarching design goals. To be fair, it was entirely capable in the job it was intended to do – it just needed to be rethought in the larger scheme of things.

I have some plans for detailed blog posts about some of the features, but I thought I’d make the first post a little more general and describe how I approached the CLI design, and some of the major principles behind it.

Simple but powerful

One of the hardest parts of designing an effective CLI is to make it simple enough for new users to understand, but powerful enough so that veterans can tweak everything they need to. With that in mind, we adopted a common design philosophy:

“Simple enough for 90% of the users to understand, powerful enough for the other 10% to use

A good example of this philosophy is the ‘zfs list’ command. I plan to delve into some of the history behind its development at a later point, but you can quickly see the difference between the two audiences. Most users will just use ‘zfs list’:

$ zfs list
NAME                   USED  AVAIL  REFER  MOUNTPOINT
tank                  55.5K  73.9G   9.5K  /tank
tank/bar                 8K  73.9G     8K  /tank/bar
tank/foo                 8K  73.9G     8K  /tank/foo

But a closer look at the usage reveals a lot more power under the hood:

list [-rH] [-o property[,property]...] [-t type[,type]...]
[filesystem|volume|snapshot] ...

In particular, you can ask questions like ‘what is the amount of space used by all snapshots under tank/home?’ We made sure that sufficient options existed so that power users could script whatever custom tools they wanted.

Solution driven error messages

Having good error messages is a requirement for any reasonably complicated system. The Solaris Fault Management Architecture has proved that users understand and appreciate error messages that tell you exactly what is wrong in plain english, along with how it can be fixed.

A great example of this is through the ‘zpool status’ output. Once again, I’ll go into some more detail about the FMA integration in a future post, but you can quickly see how basic FMA integration really allows the user to get meaningful diagnositics on their pool:

$ zpool status
pool: tank
state: ONLINE
status: One or more devices has experienced an unrecoverable error.  An
attempt was made to correct the error.  Applications are unaffected.
action: Determine if the device needs to be replaced, and clear the errors
using 'zpool online' or replace the device with 'zpool replace'.
see: http://www.sun.com/msg/ZFS-8000-9P
scrub: none requested
config:
NAME        STATE     READ WRITE CKSUM
tank        ONLINE       0     0     0
mirror    ONLINE       0     0     0
c1d0s0  ONLINE       0     0     3
c0d0s0  ONLINE       0     0     0

Consistent command syntax

When it comes to command line syntax, everyone seems to have a different idea of what makes the most sense. When we started redesigning the CLI, we took a look at a bunch of other tools in solaris, focusing on some of the more recent ones which had undergone a more rigorous design. In the end, our primary source of inspiration were the SMF (Server Management Facility) commands. To that end, every zfs(1M) and zpool(1M) command has the following syntax:

<command> <verb> <options> <noun> ...

There are no “required options”. We tried to avoid positional parameters at all costs, but there are certain subcommands (zfs get, zfs get, zfs clone, zpool replace, etc) that fundamentally require multiple operands. In these cases, we try to direct the user with informative error messages indicating that they may have forgotten a parameter:

# zpool create c1d0 c0d0
cannot create 'c1d0': pool name is reserved
pool name may have been omitted

If you mistype something and find that the error message is confusing, please let us know – we take error messages very seriously. We’ve already had some feedback for certain commands (such as ‘zfs clone’) that we’re working on.

Modular interface design

On a source level, the initial code had some serious issues around interface boundaries. The problem is that the user/kernel interface is managed through ioctl(2) calls to /dev/zfs. While this is a perfectly fine solution, we wound up with multiple consumers all issuing these ioctl() calls directly, making it very difficult to evolve this interface cleanly. Since we knew that we were going to have multiple userland consumers (zpool and zfs), it made much more sense to construct a library (libzfs) which was responsible for managing this direct interface, and have it present a unified object-based access method for consumers. This allowed us to centralize logic in one place, and the command themselves became little more than glorified argument parsers around this library.

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